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Abstract 
Retrospective evaluation (RE) of event sequences are known to be biased in various ways. 
The present paper presents a series of studies that examined the suggestion that the moments 
that are the most accessible in memory at the point of RE contribute to these biases. As 
predicted by this memory-based analysis, Experiment 1 showed that pleasantness ratings of 
word lists were biased by the presentation position of a negative item and by how easy the 
negative information was to retrieve. Experiment 2 ruled out the hypothesis that these 
findings were due to the dual nature of the task called upon. Experiment 3 further 
manipulated the memorability of the negative items—and corresponding changes in RE were 
as predicted. Finally, Experiment 4 extended the findings to more complex stimuli involving 
event narratives. Overall, the results suggest that assessments were adjusted based on the 
retrieval of the most readily available information.  
Keywords: retrospective evaluations, memory, on-line judgement, accessibility, order 
effects 
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Retrospective Evaluations of Sequences: Testing the Predictions of a Memory-based Analysis 
It is a common experience to reflect on past events, evaluating them in hindsight. 
Events typically hold features we encounter in a sequential manner, as information unfolds 
over time; such experiences are usually called temporal sequences (Lowenstein & Prelec, 
1993). Each piece of information acquired might have varied in quality, intensity or valence; 
nevertheless, retrospective evaluations (RE) typically involve a cohesive unitary response 
(e.g., Baumgartner, Sujan, & Padgett, 1997).  
RE have been investigated in a number of disparate domains (e.g., Fredrickson, 2000), 
including for example, the evaluation of pain (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996) and payment 
sequences (Langer, Sarin, & Weber, 2005). One of the important conclusions of this work is 
that RE are biased. For instance, the ‘Peak-End’ rule proposes that the final moments and the 
most intense parts of an experience disproportionately affect RE (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993). Personality impression formation is also biased; when participants read a set of 
adjectives about a hypothetical character, the impression formed is usually more positive 
when favourable adjectives precede more unfavourable ones, rather than the reverse (Asch, 
1946).  
A common feature of the above findings is that certain moments or characteristics of 
an event weigh more heavily in RE than others (e.g., Ariely & Carmon, 2000). One 
overarching interpretation of these findings involves a memory-based approach; this 
approach suggests that the aforementioned biases are attributable to the accessibility of the 
biasing moments in memory (e.g., Montgomery & Unnava, 2009). Indeed, a number of 
authors have recently argued that a more thorough consideration of specific memory 
processes would benefit our understanding of a number of issues in the judgment and 
decision making literature (e.g., Platzer & Bröder, 2012; Weber & Johnson, 2009).  
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With respect to RE, consider for example the peak-end effects mentioned above; these 
could be understood by assuming that the peak is distinctive and hence more memorable 
while the end benefits from the mnemonic advantages related to the recency effect, where the 
last encountered information in a series is better remembered. If it is assumed that the more 
accessible moments at the point of RE weigh more heavily in the assessment, then biases can 
be predicted based on the memorability of sequence elements. 
Recent findings provide support for a memory-based approach to RE. For example, 
Montgomery and Unnava (2009; Study 1) presented participants with a description of a 
vacation that included incidents of different quality, ranging from very negative (a bad 
sunburn) to very positive (discovering and enjoying a festival). The position of negative and 
positive incidents was manipulated between-subjects, so that participants either received an 
improving sequence or a deteriorating one. Participants were then asked to rate the vacation 
as a whole and to recall events. Crucially, the authors manipulated the delay between the 
presentation of the sequences and their evaluation and recall. In line with well-established 
findings in the memory literature (e.g., Bjork & Whitten, 1974), the authors found that the 
delay led to a decrease in recency effects. More importantly, the recall results showed that the 
delay lowered the accessibility of the information appearing later in the sequence; as a result, 
deteriorating sequences were preferred to improving ones—the opposite pattern was observed 
in the immediate condition.  
Although these findings provide compelling evidence for a memory-based approach, 
an analysis reported in an influential paper by Hastie and Park (1986) may limit the 
generalisability and impact of this type of evidence. Hastie and Park (1986) examined the 
role of memory in RE and concluded that memory-based assessments are unlikely when 
participants are aware of the upcoming judgment task—as people are likely to be 
constructing their assessment as events unfold (on-line evaluations). Indeed, a number of 
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studies in social cognition have found memory and judgment to be unrelated (e.g., Anderson, 
1989; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987). Less surprisingly, the authors found that when people are 
instead unaware of the upcoming judgment task, they must rely on the mnemonic record of 
the actual processed information in order to produce RE: This is because the on-line 
evaluation did not take place.  
Acknowledging these considerations, Montgomery and Unnava (2009) suggested that 
situations that involve on-line evaluations may reduce the predictive value of a memory-
based analysis. Indeed, in their Study 1, participants only evaluated one sequence of items 
and they were not aware of the specifics of the judgment task to follow. Hence, it is not clear 
if a memory-based approach could predict RE when participants are aware that an overall 
assessment will be required—as this situation is most likely to foster on-line evaluations.  
The general aim of the present paper is to provide a stricter test of the predictions of a 
memory-based analysis of RE (e.g., Montgomery & Unnava, 2009; Weber & Johnson, 2009); 
more specifically, we investigate whether a memory-based analysis can predict RE even in 
situations where on-line judgment formation is not inhibited. 
Also, the role that memory may play in biasing RE is under further scrutiny in a 
number of ways. First, for the first time, we tested whether any association between memory 
and RE would be maintained when participants could not anticipate a memory test. For most 
studies investigating the relationships between memory and judgment (e.g., Hastie & Park, 
1986; Montgomery & Unnava, 2009), the dual nature of the task might have artificially 
induced participants to rely on the memory representation when providing a RE, when 
otherwise they would not do so. 
Second, we used a series of memory manipulations—implemented either during or 
after stimulus encoding—and put forward specific predictions based on the expected 
memory-based contribution to RE.  
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Third, to our knowledge, previous studies have not controlled for variables which are 
known to affect memory performance (e.g., stimulus frequency and familiarity); the studies 
reported below included these controls. Such factors could artificially inflate or diminish the 
associations between memory and RE; for instance, a positive attribute might have an impact 
on RE because of its valence, but it may not be recalled because other items are higher in 
familiarity or frequency (and will hence be easier to recall).  
Lastly, we present more detailed analyses of the associations between memory and 
RE. Previous research has generally involved simple correlations between RE ratings and 
global or general memory measures where each item recalled is assumed to have the same 
influence on judgment (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986). To our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
provide an analysis of the association between recall output position and RE. Since items 
could be recalled in any order, we made the simplifying assumption that items recalled first 
were on average more readily accessible in memory. This analysis allowed us to look in 
further detail at the memory processes and representations that inform judgment and 
decision-making (e.g., Weber & Johnson, 2009) in relation to accessibility. The overweighing 
of specific information in RE might not be due simply to it being present (vs. absent) in 
memory at the time of judgment: If participants are accessing the degraded trace of the just-
seen information, then a single item might be ‘weighed’ in judgment inversely to its 
degradation.  
Experimental Strategy and Predictions 
Participants rated the pleasantness of word lists (Experiments 1, 2 and 3) or stories 
told through slideshows and audio recordings (Experiment 4).  After providing this judgment, 
a recall task was performed. Memory always followed judgment; this strategy was adopted 
because recall followed by judgement could artificially boost the relationship between the 
remembered material and RE (e.g., Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002). 
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Experimental sequences contained a negative item (or event), inserted within neutral 
material. Across experiments, the memorability of this negative item was varied in a number 
of ways. We also examined how judgment varies as a function of the recall of the negative 
information. If the negative item is recalled after RE, it seems likely that it was also available 
at the time of judgment. Conversely, if the negative item is not available for recall, the 
probability that it was available at the time of judgment is reduced. Hence, on average, 
ratings should be lower when the negative item is available for the memory component of the 
task. We further examined the relationship between RE and memory further by analysing 
output position in the recall task; it was hypothesised that the earlier a negative item was 
recalled, the stronger its impact on RE.   
General Methodology 
Materials 
For the word list experiments, item valence was manipulated. The words (see 
Appendix A) were selected from the Affective Norms of English Words database (ANEW; 
Bradley & Lang, 1999). Negative words were low in valence (less than 3, on a 1-9 scale) and 
high in arousal (over 6, on a 1-9 scale); neutral item valence was middling (4.5 to 6.9) and 
low on the arousal scale (less than 5). The serial position in which a negative item appeared 
was manipulated. For instance, ‘P1’ lists included a negative item in the first position, 
followed by neutral items. ‘Control’ lists contained only neutral items.  
Negative lists—i.e. those including a negative item—were matched on valence and 
arousal ratings. Control lists were matched on both valence and arousal with the neutral 
words included in the negative lists. Negative items were rotated, so that each one appeared 
in each position an equal number of times across participants; items were not repeated across 
trials. 
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For Experiment 4, a female voice presented a narrative that accompanied a series of 
six sequentially presented photographs/slides. The pictures were selected from the 
International Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Negative 
slides were low in valence (less than 3, on a 1-9 scale), while neutral slides were middling 
(from 3.8 to 5.9; d = 4.1). The negative slides (M = 4.0) were also higher in arousal ratings 
than neutral slides (M = 2.4, d = 2.6). 
Within-list matching between the negative (if any) and the neutral items ensured that 
negative and neutral words were equated on familiarity ratings (Coltheart, 1981), number of 
phonemes, and ‘K-F’ frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967). For the slides, matching was 
based on distinctiveness and memorability ratings (Lang et al., 1999)—and the number of 
words and phonemes used in the narratives accompanying each slide. Every effort was made 
to equate the recordings of the narratives across stories. The same female voice was used, and 
the tone of the voice used was regular and did not express emotion.  The grammatical 
structure of all the sentences was comparable – they usually involved only a subject and a 
predicate.  
Procedure 
Participants in Experiments 1 and 3 were individually tested via a computer program 
written in Authorware 7.0 (Adobe / Macromedia). Experiments 2 and 4 were run online. 
In all experiments, introductory screens presented the procedure and gathered 
demographic data. Participants were told that the aim of the experiment was to collect 
normative data regarding the pleasantness of word lists (or stories). For words lists, each 
word appeared for one second with an inter-stimulus interval of 0.75 seconds. A series of 
asterisks appeared for three seconds to signal the end of list presentation. For the narratives, 
each slide was on screen for 4 seconds. As the recording that accompanied each slide did not 
exceed 3.1 seconds, brief pauses surrounded each sentence.  
MEMORY AND RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATIONS   9 
Participants were to attend to each series and provide an overall pleasantness rating.  
The ratings were on a 0-100 scale (0 = very unpleasant, 100 = very pleasant) and use of the 
whole range was encouraged. Participants clicked on a slider bar (with extremes of 0 and 
100) on a position they felt was closest to their impression of the list/story. To limit anchoring 
effects (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002) a sliding marker appeared on the bar, with its 
numerical value below, only after the first click. Participants could then adjust this initial 
rating; they confirmed their final rating by clicking on a “Continue” button.  
The memory task was an easy version of a free recall task. After each series, 
participants had to type in the two elements that most readily came to mind –words or a brief 
description of story moments; they then pressed a continue button.  Then, they could recall 
any further item they remembered, if any. It was stressed that it was equally fine to proceed 
directly to the next trial, without adding any further items, and that both the judgment and 
recall tasks were important. Participants were specifically asked not to neglect the rating task 
in order to proceed more quickly to the recall task. This modified version of the free recall 
task was used to reduce cognitive demands. Previous research showed that typical recall 
tasks, which require participants to perform an exhaustive search in memory, can mask 
associations between memory and judgment (e.g., Kitayama & Burnstein, 1989). Two 
practice trials were provided. List/story presentation order was randomised independently for 
each participant and no time limits were set for the rating and recall tasks.  
Data Analysis 
When analysing the relationship between memory and RE, in order to reduce the 
extent of inter-individual differences in the use of the rating scale, judgment scores were 
transformed. For each participant, the average pleasantness rating for the Control lists was 
subtracted from the pleasantness ratings for each list containing a negative item. The 
corrected judgment scores (J’) represented how much more unpleasant each list was in 
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comparison to the average Control list. Average J’ scores were obtained for each participant, 
according to the negative item presentation position and whether the negative item presented 
in the list was recalled or not.1 
Due to the dual nature of the task, a precautionary measure was taken in order to 
exclude from the analyses any participant who neglected the judgment task. Participants 
whose judgment scores were characterised by a standard deviation smaller than five (i.e., 5% 
of the 0-100 scale) were eliminated from the analyses (in total, from 0.8% to 3.1% across 
experiments). Moreover, for the online experiments, participants were also excluded if the 
time to complete the task was three times longer (or more) than the average duration of the 
experiment (in total, from 1.3% to 4.4% across experiments).   
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, the position of a negative item within the to-be-assessed list was 
manipulated.  The predictions of a memory-based approach are straightforward. A negative 
item appearing in the first (primacy) or last (recency) position will tend to be more readily 
available in memory following list presentation. It follows that RE for such lists is predicted 
to be lower than RE for lists where the negative item appears in the middle positions. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 38 participants (21 females) aged from 19 to 55 (M = 40.9, 
SD = 11.4) took part in the study; they were awarded £7 for their participation. 
Design, Materials and Procedure. A series of 32 six-word lists were created (see 
Appendix); there were eight P1, P6 and Control lists as well as four P3 and four P4 lists (i.e. 
eight lists with a negative item in middle positions). After each list, participants performed 
the (a) RE and (b) memory tasks as described in the general method. 
Results and Discussion 
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Memory. Figure 1 (left panel) presents mean correct recall as a function of word 
position and valence. Negative items presented first or last were better recalled than negative 
items presented in the 3rd or 4th positions. 
 A 2 (valence: negative vs. neutral) × 3 (position: 1st, 3rd/4th, and 6th) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of valence; negative items were better recalled 
than neutral ones and there was no interaction between position and valence. Note that all the 
ANOVA-based inferential statistics for all the experiments are presented in Table 1. A main 
effect of position showed that P1 recall was higher than P3/4 (d = 0.94) and also that P6 
recall was higher than P3/4 (d = 0.31); thus, primacy and recency effects were observed for 
the recall of the negative items. 
RE. The mean pleasantness rating for the Control lists was higher—more positive—
than the ratings for the other list types. Moreover, there is evidence of both primacy and 
recency in the ratings (see Figure 1, right panel): P1 and P6 lists were rated less positively 
than the lists with a negative item in the middle positions.  
A one-way ANOVA with list type (P1, P3/4, P6 and Control) as the within-subject 
factor confirmed the above observations. Judgments for P6 or recency lists were lower than 
those for P3/4 lists (d = 0.22); ratings for P1 or primacy lists were lower than ratings for P3/4 
lists (d = 0.31).   
We also ran a subsidiary study where no memory task was used, as this allowed us to 
determine whether demand effects altered the retrospective judgment pattern. A total of 21 
participants (11 males) volunteered to take part in this study; their ages ranged from 21 to 40 
years (M = 27.9, SD = 4.9). The results showed that the RE pattern was the same when no 
memory task was included: Both primacy (d = 0.54) and recency effects (d = 0.65) were 
observed for pleasantness ratings. 
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Memory-RE Associations. Overall, when the negative item was recalled in the 
memory task, pleasantness ratings were lower (M = -15.7, SD = 10.7) than when the negative 
item was not recalled (M = -8.5, SD = 9.2); this relationship between memory and judgment 
seems evident across list types (see Table 2). 
 A significant main effect of memory (item recalled vs. not recalled) confirmed the 
above observations; moreover, the relationship between memory and judgment was observed 
across positions, as the list type by memory interaction was not significant.  
Finally, RE results were analysed depending on the output position of the negative 
item in recall. Table 3 shows that the pleasantness ratings were lowest when the participants 
recalled the negative item as either the first or second response.  A significant main effect of 
recall position on pleasantness ratings confirmed these observations and showed that 
judgments were lower when the negative item was recalled amongst the first two responses 
than when it was recalled amongst the last four responses (d = 0.77); moreover, the latter 
judgments were lower than those observed for lists where the negative item was not recalled 
at all (d = 0.42).   
The results of Experiment 1 confirmed that a negative item presented at the beginning 
or the end of the series exerted a larger impact on pleasantness evaluations. Primacy and 
recency effects were observed also for the recall of the negative items.  
Associations between memory and RE scores were observed: The pleasantness ratings 
for those lists where the negative item was not recalled were significantly higher (of 8.5 units 
on average, on a 0-100 scale) than for those lists where the negative item was recalled. 
Moreover, accessibility in memory of a negative item appeared to impact RE, since the 
lowest ratings were provided when the negative item was recalled as an early response. 
Two arguments might undermine these observations.  First, a third factor could be 
mediating the serial position effects on memory and the mirrored effect on RE, issue that we 
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address in Experiment 3. Second, the dual nature of the task might have artificially inflated 
the relationships between memory and RE. When performing the evaluation task, participants 
knew that they had to perform a memory task subsequently; hence, participants might have 
rehearsed the degraded representation of the list at the time of judgment—when otherwise 
they would not do so (e.g., Anderson, 1989). In other words, a general alternative explanation 
for our findings is that having to do both judgment and memory tasks for the same lists 
artificially inflated the associations between memory and judgment in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 addressed this issue. 
Experiment 2 
This experiment called upon a surprise memory task. As participants could not 
anticipate a memory test, there is no reason for the memory component of the procedure to 
have an impact on the association between what is recalled and the pleasantness ratings.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 113 participants (66 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment. Participants’ age ranged from 20 to 63 years (M = 41.6, SD = 12.7); they were 
granted Maximiles® points in exchange for their participation.  
Design, Materials and Procedure. The stimuli were 20 seven-word lists; there were 
five lists of each of the following types: P1, P4, P7 and Control. Each participant was 
presented with four trials in total; in the first trial they were always presented with a Control 
list randomly selected from the set of 5. The following trials contained a negative item with 
position rotated evenly across participants. The fourth and last trial was followed by a 
surprise memory test.  
Participants were told that they were to assess the pleasantness of word lists. Once 
they had rated the 4th and last list, a screen instructed them to recall the two words that came 
MEMORY AND RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATIONS   14 
to mind most readily from the just-presented list; on a further screen participants had a 
chance to enter any other word they remembered from the list.  
Results and Discussion  
First, we examined the difference in ratings for the trials where the negative item was 
recalled relative to the trials where it was not. An independent samples t-test with memory 
(negative item recalled vs. not recalled) as the between-subjects factor, t(105) = 2.6, p = .011, 
d = 0.52, confirmed that pleasantness ratings were higher for lists where the negative item 
was not recalled (M = 0.3, SD = 20.7)2 relative to lists where the negative item was recalled 
(M = -10.3, SD = 19.9).  
Next, we investigated the relationship between accessibility of the negative item and 
judgment (Table 3). There was a significant main effect of negative item recall position (not 
recalled; recalled as 1st response; recalled as 2nd to 4th response) on pleasantness ratings; 
when the negative item was recalled early pleasantness ratings were lower than when it was 
either not recalled or recalled as a later response (both ds > .51). RE when the negative item 
was recalled as 2nd to 4th response did not differ from when it was not recalled at all (p = .47). 
Overall, the correspondence between memory and judgment was clear: RE was lower 
when the negative item was recalled and it was lowest when the negative item was most 
easily accessible in memory. As this pattern was observed even if participants did not expect 
a memory task, it is reasonable to conclude that the memory paradigm called upon in 
Experiment 1 cannot be the source of memory-related effects on RE. 
Experiment 3 
Here, we implement a further test of the memory-based analysis by using another 
manipulation of the memorability of the negative item; indeed, experimental evidence which 
highlights correlations between memory and RE does not preclude that such correlations are 
attributable to other factors (e.g., vividness; Shedler & Manis, 1986; see also Moser, 1992). 
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Crucially, in this experiment the memorability of information was manipulated after its 
presentation, as opposed to during encoding. For some lists a filled delay was inserted after 
the item presentation. The effects of a filled delay are well established: They lead to a 
reduced recency effect. If a negative item’s accessibility in memory is lowered—by 
presenting it at the end of a list where a filled delay follows—then its impact on the summary 
assessment of the list as a whole should be smaller than if its accessibility is not hindered (no 
delay). As accessibility of the items in memory was manipulated after stimulus encoding, no 
specific, position-dependent, delay effect would be expected for judgments if RE is based on 
evaluative processes that take place during list presentation.   
Method 
Participants. A total of 79 participants (49 males) took part in the internet-based 
experiment. Participants’ age ranged from 28 to 65 years (M = 46.9, SD = 10.2) and they 
were granted Maximiles® points.  
Design, Materials and Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiments 
1 and 2, except for the delay manipulation. For half of the trials, after list presentation, 
participants were prompted to provide their pleasantness rating (immediate condition). For 
the remaining half, participants had to engage in a 10-second distractor task (delay 
condition). During this task, a letter was presented on the screen; participants were to type 
the letters that followed based on alphabetical order, skipping one letter between each entry; 
for example, if ‘A’ was presented, participants had to type in the letters ‘C’, ‘E’, ‘G’, and so 
forth. The delay was manipulated within-subjects, and the alternation between delay and 
immediate trials was randomised for each participant. After the distractor task, participants 
provided their rating of the list and then proceeded to the recall task.   
Stimuli included 22 six-word lists; six were P1 lists, four were P3/4 (two P3 and two 
P4), six were P6, and finally six were Control lists. Rotation across participants allowed each 
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list to be presented approximately the same number of times in each of the conditions defined 
by position and delay condition.  
Results and Discussion 
An additional exclusion criterion was set for this study: Six participants were 
excluded because they neglected the distractor task, as their performance ranged from 0% to 
4% correct trials (for all other participants’ performance was > 85%) 
Memory. The recall pattern for the negative items was different for the two delay 
condition—and in the line with predictions. Both primacy and recency effects were observed 
in the immediate condition; however, recency effects disappeared after a filled delay (see 
Figure 2, left panel).  
A 3 (position: 1st, 3rd/4th, and 6th)  2 (delay: immediate vs. delay) repeated measure 
ANOVA confirmed the above. The significant main effects of position and delay were 
qualified by a significant interaction term: There were no recall difference between 
immediate and delay conditions for negative items presented in the P1 and P3/4 lists (both ps 
> .79); however, for P6 lists, there was a recall advantage for the immediate condition (d = 
0.51). 
RE. The judgment pattern mirrored the memory results. P1 and P3/4 lists were rated 
as equally unpleasant in the two delay conditions; on the other hand, P6 lists were rated as 
more unpleasant in the immediate condition compared to the delay condition (see Figure 2, 
right panel)  
A 3  2 repeated measures ANOVA with list type (P1, P3/4 and P6) and delay 
(immediate vs. delay) confirmed the above: The significant main effects of position and delay 
were qualified by an interaction. There was no reliable difference in RE between immediate 
and delay conditions for P1 and P3/4 lists (both ps > .19); on the other hand, P6 lists were 
rated as significantly more  pleasant in the delay condition (d  = 0.49). 
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Memory-RE Associations. When the negative item was recalled, RE was lower (M = 
-11.7, SD = 9.6) than when it was not recalled (M = -5.9, SD = 7.0), this pattern being true for 
both conditions (see Table 4).  
A 2 (memory: negative item recalled vs. not recalled) × 2 (delay: immediate vs. delay) 
within-subjects ANOVA confirmed these observations, as the only significant effect was the 
main effect of memory. 
RE was then analysed depending on the negative item recall output position (see 
Table 3; note that in this experiment the analyses could not be broken down by delay 
condition because of the large number of missing values.) A significant main effect of recall 
position on pleasantness ratings was noted: RE was significantly lower when the negative 
item was the first or second response than when it was recalled among the last four 
responses—or not recalled at all (both ds > 0.45).  
As expected, inserting a filled delay reduced recency effects for recall; recency effects 
in the delay condition were also significantly reduced for RE. If participants had solely relied 
on evaluations formed while attending to the stimulus, there would be no reason to expect the 
observed RE pattern. 
Experiment 4 
The last experiment aimed to extend the predictions of a memory-based approach to 
more complex stimuli, namely short stories told through slides with spoken descriptions. We 
manipulated the position in which a negative slide (a moment within the story) was 
presented. It was predicted that analyses of memory and summary assessments would again 
reveal associations between recall and RE.  
Method 
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Participants. A total of 74 participants (36 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment. Participants’ age ranged from 23 to 68 years (M = 44.9, SD = 10.7) and they 
were granted Maximiles® points.  
Design, Materials and Procedure. A total of 16 six-slide stories were created, four 
each for P1, P3/4 (which had a negative slide either in third or fourth position), P6 and 
Control stories. As negative slides (M = 4.2, SD = 0.8) were lower in familiarity ratings than 
neutral slides (M = 5.8, SD = 1.1), we included a neutral picture which was closely matched 
for familiarity with the negative slide. The presentation positions of the matched neutral 
slides mirrored those of the negative pictures. As the position of negative and matched neutral 
slides was rotated across participants, any potential bias arising from serial position effects 
should be minimised. Also, the memory analyses will compare the negative slides to the 
matched neutral pictures only. In this way it was possible to limit the potential confounding 
effects of familiarity at the (later) retrieval stage. 
Negative item rotation meant that each slide (and accompanying narrative) appeared 
in each possible position (1st, 3rd/4th, and 6th) an equal number of times across participants. 
Each story was presented in three different versions, without having the overall gist changed. 
Three different versions were created for each of the four Control stories too; this allowed us 
to check whether re-ordering the slides within a story affected RE. Importantly, the wording 
which accompanied each slide did not change between the three different versions, so that no 
difference in either memory and/or RE outputs could be attributed to the wording of 
narratives.  
After attending to a short slideshow and rating its overall pleasantness, participants 
were asked to complete a memory task. First, participants typed in a brief description of the 
two moments of the story that came to mind most easily; participants were told that a simple 
description would suffice. Then, a new screen presented thumbnails of the six slides from the 
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just-presented story, in random order. The participants selected the two pictures that 
corresponded to the two descriptions they had just typed in; their selections were only used to 
resolve any potential ambiguity in the interpretation of the descriptions entered in the first 
phase of the memory task. Two practice trials were provided and included stories which were 
the same for all the participants and did not include any particularly negative event and/or 
picture. 
Results and Discussion 
Memory. Figure 3 (left panel) represents the mean recall proportion as a function of 
event position and valence. Negative events were better recalled than the neutral ones. 
Negative events presented in last position attracted the highest recall rate. 
A 2 (valence: negative vs. neutral) × 3 (position: P1, P3/4, and P6) repeated measures 
ANOVA showed that all three effects were significant. The significant interaction showed 
that the recency effect was stronger for neutral events than for negative events. Most 
importantly, negative P6 events were better remembered than P3/4 and P1 negative event 
(both ds > 0.28). 
Contrary to word lists (Experiment 1), only recency effects were observed for short 
stories (for similar results with visual stimuli, see Dolenc, Bon, & Repovš, 2013; Hay, Smyth, 
Hitch, & Horton, 2007). This result is reconcilable with recent findings that suggest that 
primacy effects in memory are mostly due to rehearsal (e.g., Tan & Ward, 2000). It is 
reasonable to argue that when the material involved unrelated word lists, rehearsal was more 
likely than when short stories were involved as the latter promote more relational information 
processing (e.g., gist extraction).  
RE. Preliminary analyses confirmed that changing the order of the slides did not 
affect RE for Control stories, F(2, 66) = 1.4, p = .23. 
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The Control lists were rated as the most pleasant story type. More importantly, 
recency effects were observed for the pleasantness ratings (see Figure 3, right panel). A 
repeated measures one-way ANOVA revealed that the main effect of story type was 
significant and that P6 stories were rated as less pleasant than P1 and P3/4 stories (both ds > 
0.25).  
To confirm that the RE pattern was not influenced by having to perform a memory 
task, as for Experiment 1 we ran a subsidiary study where only RE ratings were elicited. A 
total of 113 participants (66 males) took part in an internet-based experiment. Participants’ 
age ranged from 20 to 63 years (M = 41.6, SD = 12.7) and they were granted Maximiles® 
points. Recency effects were again observed as P6 stories attracted lower RE than P1 and 
P3/4 stories (both ds > 0.18). 
Memory-RE Associations. Table 5 shows that when the negative event was recalled 
in the memory task, RE for the story was lower (M = -23.5, SD = 17.2) than when it was not 
recalled (M = -14.7, SD = 14.6)—this pattern being constant across story types.  
A 2  3 within-subjects ANOVA was run with memory (negative event recalled vs. 
not recalled) and story type (P1, P3/4, and P6) as the factors and revealed a significant main 
effect of memory that was not qualified by the interaction term, indicating that the association 
between memory and RE measures was observed regardless of presentation position.  
RE was then analysed as a function of narrative accessibility (see Table 3). A 
significant main effect of negative event output position showed that negative events recalled 
as first responses were associated with more unpleasant ratings than those recalled as second 
response (d = 0.21).3 
General Discussion 
The above findings provide evidence supporting a memory-based approach to RE. In 
the experiments involving word-list pleasantness, we manipulated the memorability of a 
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negative item in a two ways, either during encoding (serial position of target item) or after 
encoding (delay between presentation and recall). In both cases, we correctly predicted 
changes in RE on the basis of the specific changes in the memorability of the target item. 
Moreover, list pleasantness ratings were lower for the lists where the negative word was 
recalled—compared to the ratings for the lists where the negative item was not recalled—and 
lowest when it was most easily accessible in memory; the latter result suggests that easily 
accessible information weighs more heavily in RE and hence contributes to biasing 
judgments. The basic pattern of results that was obtained for word lists was then reproduced 
with more complex and easy to integrate materials, namely event-stories. Finally, memory-
judgment relationships were observed even when participants did not anticipate a memory 
task; this result helped to rule out the possibility that participants were artificially induced to 
rely on the memory representations when providing a RE.   
 Taken together, the results suggest that participants consulted the episodic record they 
retained from each sequence in order to assess it in hindsight—and adjusted their judgment 
based on the information that was most readily available. In effect, two categories of accounts 
are compatible with our findings. The first suggests that RE is based on memory alone – that 
is that any assessments that participants make as the experimental events unfold do not 
contribute to their construction of an overall RE. The second view suggests that RE is the 
result of on-line impression formation that is adjusted when the summary evaluation is 
provided; this adjustment would be based on the information that is readily recalled at the 
time. In other words, this latter view suggests that RE is a form of anchor and adjustment 
process—a first impression is formed as the information is encountered and this serves as a 
form of anchor. The latter is then adjusted depending on the information that is most easily 
available and accessed. The findings we report do not allow us to clearly favour either 
account –nor were the experiments designed to. However, our results are not compatible with 
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views where memory does not play a role in RE; such views could not predict or explain the 
findings reported here without putting forward much less parsimonious accounts.   
One might be tempted to suggest that the findings are not surprising and that most 
researchers would expect memory to play a role. However, other judgment literatures 
strongly argue for the functional independence of memory and judgment; this is the case in a 
number of instances within work in social cognition (e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & 
Gütig, 2001). These views hold that stimulus evaluation and encoding into memory are two 
independent processes, which are called upon depending on the nature of the task at hand. In 
their influential paper, Hastie and Park (1986) argue that memory-judgment correlations 
should only arise when participants are not aware of the subsequent judgment task—a 
condition that does not apply to the present paradigm, as participants were told about the 
rating task beforehand.   
Given the above evidence in favour of the role of memory in biasing RE, one might 
wonder why correlations between memory and judgment have not always been observed 
across tasks and domains (for a review, see Hastie & Park, 1986). Although we did not 
address this question experimentally, we can offer two observations that might shed some 
light on this issue. One straightforward suggestion is that person-centred judgements (e.g., 
Asch, 1946) are different to other event sequences. After all, we all have significant 
experience in judging other people; our judgments will be guided by our theories about other 
people’s motives and our knowledge about how to infer internal states and traits from 
behaviour (Srull & Wyer, 1989). This being said, assuming there is sufficient commonality 
between the RE of event sequences and RE of other people, how might we explain that the 
relationship between memory and judgment is not always reported? First, the present findings 
suggest that not all the information available in memory has the same influence on 
retrospective judgment. However, in the social cognition studies where the memory-
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judgement relation was assessed, all the recalled information is treated as equivalent. For 
example, together with other studies which investigated memory-judgment correlations (e.g., 
Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987) Hastie and Park (1986) used ratios as a memory measure. In their 
Experiment 1, participants heard a recorded 5-min conversation between two people, after 
which they had to assess the job suitability of one of the two characters and recall the 
elements they could remember from the conversation. The authors computed a ratio for each 
participant by dividing the positive arguments recalled (i.e. those supporting candidate 
suitability) by the total number of arguments remembered: the higher the ratio, the more 
favourable the memory for the specific candidate. This memory measure was then correlated 
with the overall job suitability rating the participant provided for the hypothetical character. 
An implicit assumption underlying the use of this type of ratio is that each argument recalled 
(and each item on the participants’ mind at the time of judgment) has the same weight in the 
overall evaluation. Such an assumption is disputable in light of the present findings and other 
theoretical propositions (e.g., Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) which 
hold that the ease of recall of a given piece of information influences its effect on evaluations. 
This would in turn entail that a memory measure (like a ratio) which assigns the same weight 
to each recalled item may not adequately represent the memory content accessed in order to 
produce/adjust overall assessments. Relative to previous research that focused on the 
relationships between memory and judgment (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, 
& Hastie, 1979), the present study utilised more comprehensive memory measures.   
A second point relates to the choice of the memory task. Here, participants had to 
recall the two items that most readily came to mind, and subsequently, any other item they 
remembered.  The major difference with a standard free recall task—which was used in most 
of the other studies which assessed memory-judgment correlations—is that in the latter 
participants are asked to recall as many items as they can remember, and this increases the 
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retrieval-related demands of the task. Previous research has highlighted how people seem 
reluctant to consult all the information they retain about a stimulus in order to judge it; in 
fact, it seems that they stop their search in memory rather early, as soon as some degree of 
subjective certainty is achieved (Kitayama & Burnstein, 1989; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; see 
also Higgins, 1996). As evaluations appear based on partial information—on the elements 
that are most easily retrieved—it is perhaps not so surprising that research calling upon 
effortful memory tasks, that involve retrieving maximum information, struggled to find 
correlations between memory and judgment measures (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Hastie 
& Park, 1986; Shedler & Manis, 1986). 
Interestingly, different RE patterns were observed for different stimulus types; more 
specifically, recency effects only were observed for short stories (Experiment 4), whilst 
Experiment 1 on word-lists displayed both primacy and recency effects. One specific 
argument we put forward to explain these results relate to retention strategies adopted by the 
participants: Semantically unrelated word lists may have induced the use of rehearsal 
strategies more often than short stories, with the latter promoting more relational information 
processing. In fact, different RE patterns have been observed for different stimulus types and 
paradigms (e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). For instance, Asch (1946) found evidence only 
for primacy effects in person-centred judgments, whereby early adjectives guided the 
development of the personality impression; however, in relation to the present memory-based 
analysis, it is worth noting that in his seminal study Asch (1946) did not measure memory 
performance for the personality adjectives, and thus it is difficult to draw conclusions about 
the influence of memory performance on personality impression formation. We acknowledge 
that different explanations exist in the literature as to when either primacy and/or recency 
effects are observed in RE (e.g., the nature of the evaluation task; Zauberman, Diehl, & 
Ariely, 2006). However, for the purpose of the present memory-based analysis, it is worth 
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noting that the pattern of results observed here cannot be accounted for by ‘pure’ on-line 
judgment and decision-making models. For instance, the Belief-and-Adjustment model 
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) states that either one of two processing strategies will be adopted 
when evaluating sequential information. In Step-by-Step (SbS) processing, after each piece of 
information is encountered the overall assessment of the sequence is reviewed—this leading 
to a recency effect for judgment, as the last element will have approximately the same weight 
in the overall evaluation as all the aggregated information that preceded it. Conversely, in 
End-of-Sequence (EoS) processing, participants perform a single adjustment, as they adjust 
an initial impression based on early information “by the aggregate impact of the succeeding 
set of evidence” (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; p. 12). EoS processing will therefore lead to 
primacy effects, as early information has roughly the same impact on summary assessments 
as all the information following it. The Belief-Adjustment model suggests the choice of 
strategy is determined by task-related variables (e.g., familiarity of the task, complexity and 
length of the to-be-evaluated stimuli). Complex and long information series (or evaluations 
tasks with which participants are rather unfamiliar) would be more likely to lead to SbS 
processing—and recency effects. On the other hand, simple and short information (or familiar 
tasks) would be associated with EoS processing—and consequently with primacy biases 
(Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). In relation to the current experiments, the important point is that 
the Belief-and-Adjustment model can explain the recency effects observed in Experiment 4; 
however, the model would not be able to explain the findings in Experiment 1 as it predicts 
either primacy or recency effects, whilst both were observed.  
The present findings are also in line with other, more recent models that relate 
memory and judgment processes in order to explain decision-making phenomena. For 
instance, the Decision-by-Sampling model (DbS; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) proposes 
that, when facing a choice, people retrieve from memory (or sample from the decision-
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making context) instances similar to those at hand (the decision sample). To make a decision, 
people are thought to rank the target option within the decision sample; the outcome of this 
comparison will determine the subjective value of the evaluated stimulus. Indeed, previous 
research has provided support for the notion that people base their judgment on the subset of 
information that comes to mind when facing a task (e.g., Higgins, 1996). However, the results 
from the present experiments suggest that, even within this subset, not all information is 
treated equally. Rather, the influence that specific information has on judgment is 
proportional to its relative accessibility; here, the same negative information had different 
impact on RE depending on its recall output position: The later the item was recalled, the 
smaller its weight in RE. In line with this interpretation, and contrary to the DbS assumption 
that all retrieved stimuli are weighed equally in judgment, empirical evidence suggests that 
how a specific item in the decision sample differs from the target item may determine its 
influence on judgment; for example, retrieved values that are less distant from the target item 
are weighted more heavily in price judgments (e.g., Qian & Brown, 2005).  
Recent findings converge on the idea that a memory-based approach can contribute to 
explaining several judgment and decision-making phenomena. For instance, recently Heit and 
Hayes (2011) have shown how manipulating the memorability of relevant items successfully 
predicted participants’ performance in property induction tasks. A memory-based approach 
has been recently shown to explain risky decision-making. Madam, Ludvig, and Spetch 
(2014) found that participants overweighed the largest gains and losses in a paradigm where 
they had to make repeated choices between safe and risky options. The authors put forward 
the ‘extreme-outcome’ rule whereby the above mentioned biases are explained by the effect 
that salience exerts on the memorability of rewards. In line with the present series of results, 
the authors also found that participants tended to recall the extreme outcomes (i.e., the largest 
gains and losses) early in the recall protocol. Finally, Platzer, Bröder, & Heck, 2014 (see also 
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Platzer & Bröder, 2012) showed that a memory-based approach can also explain the decision 
strategies used in multi-attribute decision-making (MADM). In MADM, information 
elements of different quality need to be integrated in order to reach a decision or make a 
choice. In their experiments, the authors manipulated the mnemonic accessibility of visual 
cues by varying their salience. The results showed that when the accessibility of less valid 
information is increased, participants more often made use of compensatory strategies, 
whereby all cue information is taken into account in order to take a decision. On the other 
hand, increasing the accessibility of valid information was more often associated with non-
compensatory strategies that are based only on a subset of the available information. Thus, 
these findings suggest that the interaction between relative accessibility of information and its 
quality can explain people’s decision-making strategies.  
In conclusion, the present findings show that a memory-based analysis can predict RE 
of event sequences even in situations where participants know beforehand that an assessment 
will be required and in situations where participants do not anticipate a memory test. We 
hence concur with Montgomery and Unnava (2009) that adopting a memory-based 
perspective can contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of the RE of temporal 
sequences. We have argued that while accessibility is most likely not the only contributor to 
RE, adopting a memory-based analysis can contribute to a more comprehensive explanatory 
framework. We think such an analysis may be particularly important in applied settings. If it 
can be established that interfering with the retrieval of negative elements and enhancing 
memory for more positive events can induce a more positive RE, then the frequency of 
health-related behaviours—to name one example—can perhaps be increased.  
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Footnotes 
1 This analysis yielded missing values (ranging from 2.8% to 10.4% across 
experiments). Missing values were replaced using different methods, including mean 
substitution by subject, grand mean, and Expectation-Maximization algorithm (Schafer & 
Olsen, 1998). As all the analyses returned the same results in all cases, we will be reporting 
the data obtained via mean by subject substitution. Also, here and throughout the paper all the 
missing values were missing completely at random as the MCR Little’s test was never 
significant (all ps > .15). 
2 Interestingly, the pleasantness ratings for those lists where the negative item was 
presented but not recalled were very close to zero. This finding would suggest that, as 
memory task demands are reduced to zero, a pure memory-driven approach can best explain 
retrospective judgment. However, the one-trial nature of this experiment would suggest 
caution in interpreting the results—further studies need to be conducted to assess the 
reliability of this finding. 
3 In order to rule out the possibility that demand characteristics artificially inflated the 
findings about the relationship between memory and judgment, additional considerations and 
analyses are offered here. First, it is important to notice that in Experiment 2, where 
participants performed a surprise memory task and thus could not strategically adjust their 
evaluation strategies, the observed relationship between memory and judgment is similar to 
that observed in the other experiments—in fact, it is even stronger. Second, we would argue 
that, due to the repeated trials, participants expected the summary evaluations to be prompted 
after the presentation of the stimuli. As such, according to the analysis of Hastie and Park 
(1986), this paradigm should have promoted online judgment (as opposed to memory-based) 
strategies, which, in turn, should have actually hindered any relationship between memory 
and judgment. Third, we have run additional analyses that explored the relationship between 
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memory and judgment when only the first few trials are considered. In Experiment 1, when 
only the first trial is considered, the average corrected pleasantness rating when the negative 
item was not recalled was -13.0 (SD = 11.7); the corrected judgment for those trials where the 
negative item was recalled was -16.3 (SD = 17.4; t(34) = 0.5, p = .613). We acknowledge that 
the difference was not significant, although this result was probably due to the variability in 
the judgment scores and the insufficient power to detect the underlying effect. Indeed, when 
the first two trials were included in the analysis, the difference approached significance (p = 
.132), which was reached when the first three trials were analysed (p = .020).  The pattern of 
results was similar for Experiment 3: When only the first trial was analysed, the average 
corrected pleasantness rating when the negative item was not recalled as -6.9 (SD = 12.5); the 
corrected judgment for those trials when the negative item was recalled was -9.6 (SD = 15.5; 
t(70) = 0.7, p = .494). When the second trial was included in the analysis, the above 
difference became significant (p = .035). A similar pattern is observed when the analysis was 
split by delay condition. Finally, in Experiment 4 the results were more clear cut as showed a 
significant effect when only the first trial was included in the analysis: The average corrected 
pleasantness rating when the negative item was not recalled was -6.7 (SD = 13.4); the 
corrected judgment for those trials when the negative item was recalled was -22.9 (SD = 18.4; 
t(54) = 3.7, p < .01). 
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Table 1 ANOVA statistics for all analyses  
Note. When degrees of freedom are not presented as integers, it is because they are adjusted 
according to the Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to violations of the sphericity 
assumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Experiment 
 
Effect 
 
df 
 
F 
 
p 
 
ηp2 
Memory Experiment 1 Position 1.7, 59.0 18.7 <.001 .35 
  Valence 1, 35 12.6 <.01 .27 
  Position*Valence 2, 70 2.3 .11  
 Experiment 3 Position 1.8, 127.6 28.8 <.001 .29 
  Delay 1, 71 10.1 <.01 .12 
  Position*Delay 2, 142 3.5 <.05 .05 
 Experiment 4 Position 1.8, 123.3 32.7 <.001 .33 
  Valence 1, 68 94.6 <.001 .58 
  Position*Valence 2, 136 9.7 <.001 .13 
       
RE Experiment 1 List type 3, 105 37.1 <.001 .51 
 Experiment 3 List type 1.8, 127.1 3.3 <.05 .04 
  Delay 1, 71 7.7 <.01 .10 
  List type*Delay 2, 142 7.4 <.001 .09 
 Experiment 4 List type 1.8, 120.6 87.6 <.001 .56 
       
Memory-RE Experiment 1 Memory 1, 35 16.2 <.001 .32 
  Memory*List type 1.9, 69.1  1.4 .12  
  Recall position 1.7, 58.3 22.0 <.001 .39 
 Experiment 2 Recall position 2, 104 5.0 <.01 .09 
 Experiment 3 Memory 1, 68 40.6 <.001 .37 
  Delay 1, 68 2.6 .11  
  Memory*Delay 1, 68 0.9 .34  
  Recall position 2, 128 15.8 <.001 .20 
 Experiment 4 Memory 1, 68 30.0 <.001 .31 
  Memory*List type 1.7, 116.9 2.4 .07  
  Recall position 1.6, 109.9 18.7 <.001 .22 
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Table 2  
Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J’) and standard deviations (SD) as a function of list 
type and negative item being recalled or not (Experiment 1) 
 
  List type 
  P1 P3/4 P6 
Was the negative  
item recalled? 
    
No M -7.7 -7.6 -11.1 
 SD (12.1) (10.2) (12.5) 
Yes M -18.3 -14.4 -15.6 
 SD (13.0) (12.1) (11.4) 
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Table 3  
Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J’) and standard deviations (SD) as a function of 
negative item negative accessibility, assessed via its recall output position (see text for further 
details) 
 
  Negative item recall output position 
  Not recalled 
 
Recalled early 
 
Recalled later 
 
Experiment 1 
 
M 
SD 
-7.6 
(8.5) 
-19.6 
(12.5) 
-11.3 
(9.0) 
Experiment 2 
 
(between-subjects) 
M 
SD 
n 
0.3 
(20.7) 
38 
-13.0 
(21.3) 
49 
-3.7 
(14.7) 
20 
Experiment 3 
 
M 
SD 
-6.9 
(7.0) 
-13.7 
(10.9) 
-8.6 
(11.5) 
Experiment 4 M 
SD 
-14.7 
(14.6) 
-24.6 
(17.6) 
-20.9 
(17.5) 
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Table 4 
Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J’) and standard deviations (SD) as a function of list 
type and negative item being recalled or not (Experiment 3) 
 
  Delay condition 
 
     Immediate        Delay 
Was the negative  
item recalled? 
 
    
No M -7.1  -4.7 
 SD (10.2)  (7.2) 
 
Yes M -12.2  -11.2 
 SD (10.3)  (10.9) 
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Table 5  
Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') and standard deviations (SD) as a function of story 
type and the negative event being recalled or not (Experiment 4) 
 
  Story type 
  P1 P3/4 P6 
Was the negative  
event recalled?  
    
No M -14.6 -19.1 -20.3 
 SD (15.4) (15.8) (16.0) 
Yes M -22.8 -22.7 -24.6 
 SD (18.3) (17.8) (17.9) 
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 mean results for (a) Memory (left panel): mean recall as a function of word position and valence and (b) RE (right 
panel): mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list type. Error bars indicate SEM. 
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Figure 2. Mean proportion recall for negative items as a function of word position and delay condition (left panel) and mean pleasantness ratings 
as a function of list type and delay condition (right panel) Error bars represent SEM (Experiment 3). 
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Figure 3. Mean recall proportion as a function of event position and valence (left panel) and mean pleasantness ratings as a function of story type 
(right panel). Error bars indicate SEM (Experiment 4). 
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Appendix 
Word lists used for Experiment 1. 
List no. Items 
1 victim, basket, cabinet, stomach, rabbit, avenue 
2 rape, lawn, chair, hay, foot, coin 
3 devil, bench, tool, nectar, queen, trunk 
4 slave, paint, sphere, dawn, hammer, seat 
5 riot, lamb, ink, spray, custom, gender 
6 pain, cook, farm, dress, moral, hat 
7 accident, cow, corridor, machine, thermometer, humane 
8 afraid, column, smooth, vision, journal, phase 
9 anger, dream, quiet, tune, tower, bottle 
10 tragedy, passage, wonder, clothing, opinion, lantern 
11 horror, priest, statue, fabric, flower, breeze 
12 hate, item, nice, doll, silk, tree 
13 terrible, contents, sentiment, adult, industry, stove 
14 cancer, pencil, locker, tender, ankle, circle 
15 agony, obey, hawk, quart, saint, jelly 
16 danger, wine, daylight, poetry, paper, humble 
17 punishment, bandage, intellect, village, indifferent, umbrella 
18 destroy, serious, prairie, garment, nonsense, teacher 
19 burn, cord, iron, tank, tidy, fork 
20 disaster, coast, orchestra, appliance, modest, kerchief 
21 thief, bowl, vest, swamp, runner, nun 
22 hurt, coarse, unit, clock, save, pet 
23 trouble, natural, building, manner, quality, window 
24 slap, kettle, poster, tennis, trumpet, scissors 
25 candy, cannon, banner, lake, yellow, stool 
26 bereavement, barrel, elbow, milk, nonchalant, grass 
27 cat, autumn, cottage, frog, glacier, salad 
28 owl, fur, green, horse, key, letter 
29 engine, kerosene, dove, honey, egg, watch 
30 chin, crown, metal, plant, radio, rock 
31 fish, bar, movie, mystic, truck, butter 
32 flag, person, rattle, river, theory, violin 
Notes. Normative values about word valence, arousal, familiarity and frequency can be 
obtained from the first author. The negative item is always listed as the first item. Lists 25-32 
are Control lists.  
